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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR FACTUAL
COMPILATIONS-REVIVING THE
MISAPPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION
A telephone directory generally is not thought to exist in the same
category of intellectual property' as a book of memoirs. Nevertheless,
the copyright law of the United States Code protects them both2 as "lit-
erary works,"3 even though one merely lists names, while the other con-
veys nonfiction narrative of historical importance.
Federal copyright law has extended protection to compilations of facts
since 1790, when Congress passed the first copyright statute,4 pursuant
to the copyright and patent clause of the Constitution.5 The term "com-
pilations," however, was not statutorily defined until Congress passed the
1976 Copyright Act, 6 which describes a compilation as "a work formed
by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that
are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting
work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship."' Compila-
tions of fact include works such as directories, maps, catalogs and
indexes.8
1. "Intellectual property" refers generally to the law of patents, trade secrets, trade-
marks, and copyrights. See E. Kintner and J. Lahr, An Intellectual Property Law Primer
chs. 2-5 (2d ed. 1982). The term is somewhat of an oxymoron because the creator of such
property can only "own" it, that is, exclude others from its use, if he does not let it out of
his physical possession. See White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S.
1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J., concurring) ("The notion of property starts... from confirmed
possession of a tangible object and consists in the right to exclude others from interfer-
ence with the more or less free doing with it as one wills. But in copyright property has
reached a more abstract expression."). Authors of intellectual works physically cannot
control reproduction and distribution once a copy has left their possession. Thus, the
copyright law is necessary to aid authors in controlling the reproduction of their work.
Copyright law traces its roots to the Statute of Anne, the first statute to recognize the
rights of authors. See 8 Anne ch. 19 (1709). For a history of copyright law in England
and the United States, see L. Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (1968).
2. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756
F.2d 801, 809 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating "[d]irectories can receive copyright protection as
'literary works' "); Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547-49
(1985) (holding memoirs of President Ford protected by copyright).
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (protecting "original works of authorship" includ-
ing "literary works"); ia § 101 (literary works are "works, other than audiovisual works,
expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols").
4. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (protecting authors or assignees of
any "map, chart, book"); see Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763, 764-65 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828)
(No. 1,580) (stating charts containing information on surveys and soundings may receive
protection under copyright).
5. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
6. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
7. Id § 101.
8. "Compilations," as defined in the statute, encompasses compilations of
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Despite this long history of copyright protection for compilations, con-
siderable confusion persists regarding the standards required for copy-
right protection of factual compilations.9 The controversy centers on
whether a compiler's labor alone supplies a sufficient basis for copyright
protection,10 or whether other criteria, such as arrangement or selection
of the facts in the compilation, constitute the sole determinants of eligi-
bility for such protection.11 The disagreement over protection for labor
also pervades the case law addressing the extent of protection 2 afforded
to copyrightable compilations, which is delimited by the law of infringe-
ment 13 and fair use.14 In practical terms, for example, these issues arise
when one directory publisher uses information from a prior, copyrighted
directory.
These controversies continue because certain doctrines of copyright
law are not easily applied to factual compilations. In response to these
theoretical inconsistencies, some courts and commentators suggest that
state misappropriation law should govern the protection of compila-
tions'" because its rationale is better suited to the nature of factual
noncopyrightable material (facts), such as directories, as well as compilations of copy-
rightable material, such as literature anthologies. The latter are known as "collective
works," which are a particular type of statutory compilation. See 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982); H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 122, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 5659, 5737 (collective work is a type of compilation composed of mate-
rial that is copyrightable in its own right). This Note focuses on the peculiar problems of
compilations consisting of facts and other noncopyrightable material in the public
domain.
9. See Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Copyright
law and compilations are uneasy bedfellows. . . ."); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Man-
agement Sys., 634 F. Supp. 604, 608 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("The copyrightability of factual
compilations.., presents intellectual difficulties in determining where protectible copying
of facts ends and unlawful copying of the compilation begins."); Moore v. Lighthouse
Publishing Co., 429 F. Supp. 1304, 1309 (S.D. Ga. 1977) ("One emerges from this jungle
of generality, contradiction and uncertainty with the impression that the only thing cer-
tain in this area of law is the lack of it.").
10. This view emphasizes the labor expended by a compiler and is called the "sweat
of the brow" test. See Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131-
32 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding proper focus is effort expended by compiler); Schroeder v.
William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5-6 (7th Cir. 1977) (same). See infra notes 77-83 and
accompanying text.
11. This view, known as the "subjective selection" approach, examines the merit of
the compiler's judgment in arranging and selecting the material, explicitly disregarding
the labor of the compiler. See Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv.,
808 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1986) (determining that subjective selection and arrangement
of information merits copyright protection, not sweat of an author's brow), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 79 (1987); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Sys., 634 F. Supp. 604,
606-07 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (same); see also infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
12. The controversy here concerns whether a subsequent compiler can make use of
the data contained in the first compilation or whether he must repeat the original re-
search in order to use the same data. See infra notes 114-124.
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982); infra notes 106-128 and accompanying text.
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982); infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
15. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756
F.2d 801, 810 n.9 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright § 3.04, at 3-19; Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th
934 [Vol. 56
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compilations. 16
This Note proposes instead that copyright law is the proper means of
protection, but that its application to compilations of fact requires clarifi-
cation. Part I defines the nature of factual compilations and discusses the
constitutional and statutory bases of copyright law in general. Part II
examines the confusion in the law over the correct standard of originality
resulting from the mismatching of copyright law and factual compila-
tions. It also discusses the disagreement over the proper standard of in-
fringement applied to factual compilations: whether and to what extent
a subsequent compiler may make use of an existing compilation. Part I
recommends that where factual compilations are concerned, courts
should apply a broad standard of originality, based on the language of
the statute, which suggests that both labor and arrangement/selection
factors must be considered. Because the traditional infringement analy-
sis often cannot be applied meaningfully to these works, the resolution of
these cases must often turn on whether the alleged infringement is a fair
use.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Bases and Requirements for Copyright Protection
of Factual Compilations
The first copyright statute 7 passed by Congress pursuant to the copy-
right and patent clause of the Constitution 8 named charts and maps 9
among works protectible by copyright. Since then, the presumption that
compilations of facts are copyrightable under the Constitution's grant of
authority has not been questioned.2'
Cir. 1981)); Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts,
76 Harv. L. Rev. 1569, 1571 (1963). Another view dismisses the dilemma simply by
classifying the directory cases as a "category by themselves." See Miller, 650 F.2d at
1370.
16. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
17. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124.
18. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; supra note 5.
19. See supra note 17. Maps are pictorial compilations of geographic data. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
20. See, eg., Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985)
(ruling that "compilation of pure fact, entails originality" and is thus copyrightable);
Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83, 85 (2d Cir.)
(holding directory copyrightable), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
Case law is sparse on the construction of the copyright and patent clause. See I M.
Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.02, at 1-29 (1987). In general, courts
have construed the clause expansively. See, eg., The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94
(1879) (liberally construing "writings" to include pictorial art such as engravings and
prints); Harper & Bros. v. Kalem Co., 169 F. 61, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1909) (finding "writings"
includes motion pictures), aff'd, 222 U.S. 55 (1911); see also I M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright § 1.06[A], at 1-37 (1987) (construing "author" broadly to require
'originality' "); id, § 1.08[A], at 1-44 (1987) (construing "writings" broadly); W. Patry,
Latman's The Copyright Law at 18 (6th ed. 1986) (" '[%V]ritings' and 'authors' have been
construed very broadly. Thus, 'writings'... 'may be interpreted to include any physical
19881
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Under the 1976 Copyright Act, copyrightability requires two basic ele-
ments. 21 A work must be original, and it must be fixed in a tangible form
from which it can be "perceived, reproduced or otherwise communi-
cated."'2 2 Fixation generally is not an issue contested in compilation
cases because compilations exist on paper or in data bases from which
they can be perceived with the aid of a computer.23
Originality24 refers to independent creation, 25 and it poses a concep-
tual difficulty in the context of factual compilations because facts can be
discovered but not created.26 A compilation of facts can be assembled
independently, but the compiler must copy the individual facts from pre-
existing sources. 27 Consequently, courts disagree whether it is the com-
piler's labor expended to collect the facts28 or his selection and
arrangement ofthose facts that satisfies the independent creation (origi-
nality) requirement.29
rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.' ") (quoting Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973)).
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
22. See id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 5659, 5665.
23. See, e.g., Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 860 (2d Cir. 1984) (pub-
lished catalog); Koontz v. Jaffarian, 617 F. Supp. 1108, 1113 (E.D. Va. 1985) (data com-
pilation on computer data base copyrightable), aff'd, 787 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1986).
24. In contrast to fixation, originality is more susceptible to challenge by an oppo-
nent. Disputes over copyrightability arise in the context of infringement claims. See
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100 (1879); Januz Mktg. Communications, Inc. v.
Doubleday & Co., 569 F. Supp. 76, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Noncopyrightability may be shown by demonstrating a lack of originality. For exam-
ple, compilation cases often involve challenges to the validity of the plaintiff's copyright
on the ground that the work is not original. See, e.g., Financial Information, Inc., v.
Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204, 207-08 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79
(1987); Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 861 (2d Cir. 1984). In order to bring
suit, the copyright plaintiff must have a valid registration certificate. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 41 l(a) (1982). This constitutes prima facie evidence of a valid copyright, whose eviden-
tiary weight is within the discretion of the court. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982).
25. Courts have identified independent creation as the test of originality. See, e.g.,
Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir. 1985) (origi-
nality requires "simply that the work be independently created"); Puddu v. Buonamici
Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971) (originality means "'only that the work
owes its origin to the author, i.e., is independently created and not copied from other
works' ") (quoting 1 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 11, at 33 (1971 ed.)); Roth
Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1970) ("the originality
necessary to support a copyright merely calls for independent creation").
26. 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 2.11[A], at 2-158 (1987).
27. See, e.g., Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204,
206 (2d Cir. 1986) (compiler copied data from newspaper), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79
(1987); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 130 (8th Cir. 1985)
(compiler relied on existing business records); Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d
859, 860 (2d Cir. 1984) (compiler surveyed market).
28. See Hutchinson, 770 F.2d at 131-32; Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566
F.2d 3, 6 (7th Cir. 1977).
29. See Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204, 207-08
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79 (1987); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Manage-
ment Sys., 634 F. Supp. 604, 606-07 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
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In addition, the Supreme Court has inferred a third limitation, known
as the idea-expression dichotomy, 30 from the policy goals on which copy-
right is based.31 It mandates that copyright law protect expression only,
and not ideas.32 Facts are not protected because no one can claim au-
thorship of a fact.33 A companion principle, the merger doctrine, prohib-
its copyrighting expression of an idea that can be conveyed in only a
limited number of ways.34 These doctrines, based on the incentive-to-
disseminate theory35 underlying copyright law, limit the extent of copy-
right protection.36
The incentive-dissemination theory of copyright law attempts to pro-
vide incentives to authors, a7 in the form of exclusive rights to their
works, to encourage the creation and dissemination of works which, in
turn, benefit the public3 8 Because the dissemination of ideas constitutes
30. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (copyright protects only "the expres-
sion of the idea-not the idea itself"); see also infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text;
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
31. The primary goal of copyright is the dissemination of knowledge, attained by
providing economic incentives to authors. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation En-
ters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (citing Mazer, 347 U.S. at 209).
32. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin
Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (codi-
fying the idea-expression doctrine).
33. 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 2.1 l[A], at 2-158 (1986).
34. Because copyright protects expression only, the expression must be separable
from the nonprotectible elements, such as facts and ideas. If the underlying idea can be
conveyed only in one or a very limited number of ways, the expression is said to be
"merged" with the idea. See Patry, Copyright in Collections of Fact" A Reply, 6 Comm.
& the Law 11, 35-36 (1984) (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Co. v. Kalpakian, 446
F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)).
35. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
36. The idea-expression dichotomy doctrine limits copyright protection to expression,
whereas its companion principle, the merger doctrine, excludes from protection expres-
sion that conveys what can be expressed only in a very limited number of ways. See
Educational Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539-40 (3d Cir. 1986).
37. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ("By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the eco-
nomic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8
(reflecting an incentive-to-disseminate theory of intellectual property, rather than a the-
ory based on a natural property right or commercial morality); H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 ("The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms
of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings
... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of
science and useful arts will be promoted ... ").
38. Congress may grant copyrights, "[n]ot primarily for the benefit of the author, but
primarily for the benefit of the public." H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong. 2d Sess. 7; see I
M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.03[A], at 1-31 to 1-32.2 (1987)
(primary purpose "not to reward the author, but is rather to secure 'the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors.' ") (footnote omitted) (quoting Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). For factual compilations in particular, one
commentator states copyright law emphasizes a greater need to "disseminate and add to
knowledge in the public domain." Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copy-
right, 29 J. Copyright Soc'y 560, 560 (1982). But see Chafee, Reflections on the Law of
Copyright: I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 506 (1945) (arguing that, ideally, primary purpose
of copyright is to "benefit the author").
1988]
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the primary goal of copyright law, protection is limited to an author's
expression,39 preserving free access to facts and ideas.' Although an
author labors in creating expression, that effort is not the basis upon
which copyright protection is granted under the incentive-to-disseminate
theory.41 Similarly, as applied to a compilation of facts, the copyright
only protects the compiler's expression or presentation of the material-
not the facts themselves.42 Otherwise, the first compiler to copyright a
set of facts would exercise exclusive control of those facts.43
The following conundrum necessarily arises in compilation cases.
Compilations of facts and public domain material expressly fall within
the subject matter encompassed by the copyright statute.44 A strict ap-
plication of the idea-expression and merger doctrines, however, would
eliminate or greatly reduce the extent of copyright protection for these
works because they can be arranged in only a limited number of ways.45
Such a failure to protect compilations would ultimately undermine copy-
right policy, which is designed to "assure contributors to the store of
knowledge a fair return for their labors."' 4" Thus, courts should resolve
questions of originality more liberally in favor of copyrightability. The
39. See supra notes 30, 36 and accompanying text.
40. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954); Reyher v. Children's Television
Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); see also Harper &
Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (copyright protects only the
expression of facts, not the facts themselves).
41. See supra text accompanying notes 135-140. By contrast, under the misappropri-
ation doctrine, labor supplies the basis for protection. Misappropriation refers to several
different types of wrongful taking. See Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Pre-
emption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev.
509, 513 n.24. As used in this Note, misappropriation refers to the type recognized in
International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918). Under the Inter-
national News Service form of misappropriation (a branch of unfair competition), a com-
piler's labor and expense in creating a compilation gives rise to a quasi-property right as
against direct business competitors. Id. Present copyright standards, on the other hand,
reward labor only to the extent that it reflects original expression, which includes synthe-
sis and arrangement in compilation works. See Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d
859, 860, 862 (2d Cir. 1984); Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir.
1977).
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (copyright does not extend to "any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."); 37
C.F.R. § 202.1(b) (1987) (examples of works not copyrightable include "[i]deas, plans,
methods, systems, or devices, as distinguished from the particular manner in which they
are expressed or described in a writing").
43. See Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204, 207 (2d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79 (1987); see also Shipley & Hay, Protecting Research:
Copyright, Common-Law Alternatives, and Federal Preemption, 63 N.C.L. Rev. 125, 126
(1984) (stating that because facts may not be copyrighted, subsequent author may use
facts gathered by first author without consent).
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1982) ("The subject matter of copyright as specified by
section 102 includes compilations ... ").
45. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. Kluwer Law Book Publishers Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d
1363, 1364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
46. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985).
[Vol. 56
COPYRIGHT FOR COMPILATIONS
usefulness of broad eligibility for such protection, however, can be
reached only through consistent regulation of the use of copyrighted fac-
tual compilations by others. This is determined by the law of infringe-
ment47 and fair use.48
B. Scope of Protection: Infringement and Fair Use
The law of infringement and fair use governs the scope of copyright
protection.49 The limitations imposed by the idea-expression dichotomy
and merger doctrines also play a role in this aspect of copyright analy-
sis.5" For example, if a defendant accused of infringement can show that
he copied only an idea, he may prevail on a motion for summary judg-
ment.5 Thus, even a valid copyright does not bar copying of ideas, facts,
or merged expression.52
Infringement occurs when any of the exclusive rights53 protected by
copyright are violated.54 These rights include the right to "reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies[,] . . .to prepare derivative works based on
the copyrighted work [and] to distribute copies." 5 The copyright statute
does not specify how a violation of these rights must be proved,56 because
Congress left the development of the law of infringement to the courts.
In general, courts hold that infringement is established by evidence of
47. See infra note 49.
48. See infra note 49.
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) (fair use); 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982) (infringement).
Section 501(a) defines infringement as any violation of rights granted in sections 106-118.
In fact, section 106 defines rights of the copyright holder, see id. § 106 (reproduction,
distribution, preparation of derivative works, and, for dramatic or musical works, the
rights of performance and display), whereas sections 107-118 place limitations on those
rights, see id §§ 107-118; see also infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
The common law doctrine of fair use permits certain uses of a copyrighted work, ex-
pressly excluding such uses from the infringement label. See New York Times Co. v.
Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.N.J. 1977). The fair use doctrine
has been codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) (fair use privilege includes use for purposes of
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research); infra notes 60-
61 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 32 and infra, note 95 and accompanying text.
51. See, eg., Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.)
(granting summary judgment to defendant because only the idea copied), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 980 (1976).
52. See; e.g., Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1987)
(facts copied), cert. denied, 108 S. CL 1271 (1988); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir.) (defendant copied only facts and ideas of plaintiff's
historical interpretation), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Morrissey v. Procter & Gam-
ble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967) (only merged expression copied).
53. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
54. See id § 501(a) (1982) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights... is an
infringer. .. ").
55. See id § 106 (1982).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 501 supplies only a general definition of infringement. See H.R. Rep.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 158, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code & Cong. Admin. News,
5659, 5774 (comparing the prior law, "[tihe bill, unlike the present law, contains a gen-
eral statement of what constitutes infringement of copyright").
1988]
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direct copying and substantial taking or circumstantial evidence of copy-
ing and substantial taking. 7 In compilation cases, however, the analysis
is essentially reduced to one of two approaches. Some courts find in-
fringement if the second compiler does not start from scratch, 8 while
others permit the second compiler to take facts from the first compila-
tion, within certain limits.59
Even when copying amounts to a substantial taking, the affirmative
defense of fair use may preclude liability for infringement.' The fair use
defense requires examination of the purpose and character of the use
(whether for commercial or non-profit educational purpose), the nature
of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and the effect of the
use upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work. 6'
This doctrine is based on the policy goal of dissemination.
57. See Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d
Cir. 1977) (since direct evidence of copying is rare, infringement may be shown by cir-
cumstantial evidence-access and "substantial similarity"); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v.
Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) ("no principle can be stated as to
when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.'
Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc"); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) ("the question is whether the part so taken is 'substantial' "),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
58. See Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809,
812-13 (7th Cir. 1942) ("Any person may produce a directory of restaurants, but he must
'start from scratch,' do his own collecting, his own appraisal, and his own description and
editing."). Here, the court was not only stating the sweat of the brow test of originality-
it was stating a rule of infringement: because the defendant had not done any original
work, he had infringed the plaintiff's directory. See id. at 811-12. See also Illinois Bell
Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., No. 85-C-07644 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 1988) (LEXIS, Patcop
library, Cases file) (fair use defense not available when "defendant fails to start with his
own independent canvass and instead starts with plaintiff's copyrighted information").
59. See New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217,
219-20 (D. N.J. 1977) (traditional infringement analysis not applied; court focused on
defendant compiler's use of plaintiff's Index in creating "Personal Name Index to the
'New York Times Index,'/1851-1974" which was held to be a fair use).
60. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (fair
use traditionally defined as a privilege to use copyrighted material); Wainwright Secs.
Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977) (fair use doctrine
"distinguishes between 'a true scholar and a chiseler who infringes a work for personal
profit' ") (quoting Hearings on Bills for the General Revision of the Copyright Law Before
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1st Sess., ser. 8, pt. 3; at 1706 (1966)
(Statement of John Schulman)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); see also H.R. Rep.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News,
5659, 5678 (fair use as a defense to infringement codified for the first time in § 107 of the
1976 Copyright Act).
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). Fair use analysis resembles misappropriation doc-
trine in that it examines the nature of the use and the extent of commercial damage. See
infra note 132 and accompanying text.
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II. THE INEVITABLE CONTROVERSIES
A. Originality
Although originality is one of the threshold requirements under the
1976 Copyright Act,62 the statute purposely left the term undefined. 3
Courts have interpreted originality as independent creation,6 meaning
that a work "'owes its origin' to the 'author.' ,65 The originality stan-
dard does not require novelty66 or aesthetic merit.67 One commentator
calls it a "'modest' or 'minimal' quantum of creative effort.",61
In theory, the requirement of originality should apply uniformly to all
works.69 Nevertheless, two distinct lines of cases construing originality
in factual compilations have developed alongside the cases defining
orginality in general. At one extreme is the "sweat of the brow" or "in-
dustrious collection ' 70 approach, which looks solely to the labor, effort
62. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
63. According to the House report accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act,
[t]he phrase "original works of authorship," which is purposely left undefined,
is intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established
by the courts under the present copyright statute. This standard does not in-
clude requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no in-
tention to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them.
H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad-
min. News, 5659, 5664.
64. !Eg., Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir.
1985); Puddu v. Buonanici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971); Roth Greet-
ing Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1970).
65. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951)
(quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884)).
66. See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir.
1970); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand,
J.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
67. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ("It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute them-
selves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits.").
68. W. Patry, supra note 20 at 23; see id. at 24 ("doctrine of de minimis non curat lex
pervades all types of subject matter"). Patry notes, however, that "creative" refers to the
orgination of the work, not to artistic merit or novelty. I. at 17-18. The standard is
higher for derivative works. Id. at 24.
69. Because the orginality requirement stems directly from the language of the copy-
right clause in the Constitution, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, it should apply to all
works protected under the copyright statute. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) (codifying case
law interpretation of the Constitution's copyright clause that "authors" implies a certain
level of originality and "writings" implies that the work had to exist in a tangible form);
W. Patry, supra, note 20, at 17-18 (discussing the case law interpretation of the terms
"writings" and "authors") (citing The Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879)).
Originality was first mentioned explicitly in the 1976 Copyright Act, which codified the
requirement that courts had imposed under earlier enactments. See, e.g., Puddu v.
Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971); Roth Greeting Cards v.
United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1970); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine
Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
70. This notion was articulated in Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Pub-
lishing Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir.) (Kay, J., concurring) ("The right to copyright a book
upon which one has expended labor in its preparation does not depend upon ... anything
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and expense involved in collecting the material in a compilation.7' At
the other extreme is the "subjective selection"72 approach, which deems
a factual compilation copyrightable only if the compiler exercises some
subjective judgment in selecting or arranging the data.73
Ultimately, the two views reflect an inherent tension between two
groups with competing interests: creators and users.74 The compiler
who labors to collect material for his compilation wants to reap the fruits
of his labor by selling his work to as many buyers as possible.75 As long
as the compiler can control the reproduction of his work, his interests are
not threatened by the user. If, however, his work can be copied by a
subsequent compiler, who can thus produce a similar work at less cost,
the subsequent compiler gains a business advantage, allowing him to reap
where he did not sow. 76 This conflict is most acute in factual compila-
tions because of the basic principle that facts cannot be copyrighted.
1. Sweat of the Brow
Jurisdictions following this view hold that courts can determine the
originality of a compilation solely by examining the amount of labor and
expense involved in creating it.77 Proponents find support for this read-
more than industrious collection."), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922). The Second Cir-
cuit no longer follows the Jewelers' Circular view, see Financial Information, Inc. v.
Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding copyright statute
requires that copyright not be determined by the amount of effort the author expended),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79 (1987), but other jurisdictions still rely on its reasoning. See,
e.g., Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131-32 (8th Cir.
1985); Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977).
71. See cases cited infra note 77.
72. Shipley & Hay, supra note 43 at 141 (citing Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736
F.2d 859, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1984); Dow Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113,
116 (S.D.N.Y 1982)).
73. See cases cited infra note 84. A number of cases fall between these extremes,
recognizing both labor and arrangement as elements of originality in compilations. See
cases cited infra, note 146.
74. See Chafee, supra note 38, at 516 ("copyright law involves an adjustment between
the interests of the author ... and the interests of the consuming public").
75. See generally Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protec-
tion of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 516, 519-20 (1981) (explaining the
tension between incentives to creators and the goal of dissemination).
76. See id. at 528.
77. See, e.g., West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1226-27
(8th Cir. 1986) (affirming preliminary injunction to bar defendant from using page num-
bers appearing in West reporters, court emphasized the labor and expense incurred by
West in assembling headnotes and case summaries of the reporters, and noted that Mead
was a competitor), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer
Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1985) (responding to directory publisher's
challenge to the validity of telephone company's copyright of a "yellow pages" directory,
court stated that the relevant consideration was whether "the directory itself is derived
from information compiled and generated by [plaintiff's] efforts"); Schroeder v. William
Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 6 (7th Cir. 1977) (ruling valid copyright rested on "substan-
tial independent effort").
The sweat of the brow, or industrious collection, view of originality dates back to early
copyright jurisprudence. See, e.g., Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763, 764-65 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
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ing in the first part of the statutory definition of compilations, which
refers to "collection and assembling" of material or data.78 These cases
reflect a concern for rewarding the author for his labor."9 Thus, the
sweat of the brow view emphasizes the incentives aspect of the incentive-
to-disseminate theory. 80 This test tends to result in broad protection.8
Under the sweat of the brow test, for example, telephone directories,8"
and even the page numbers within case reporters,83 have received protec-
tion under copyright.
2. Subjective Selection
In contrast to the sweat of the brow school, a second group of courts
posits that only the compiler's subjective judgment in the selection or
arrangement of material entitles him to copyright protection." This ap-
1828) (No. 1,580); see also Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 189 F.2d 104, 106
(3d Cir. 1951) (holding copyright in map required direct observation of the terrain); Ad-
ventures in Good Eating, Inc., v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 812-13 (7th Cir.
1942) (holding copyright in a directory required original research); Leon v. Pacific Tel. &
Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 485-86 (9th Cir. 1937) (finding copyright in a directory valid be-
cause it was an "expensive, complicated, well-organized endeavor, requiring skill, ingenu-
ity, and original research").
78. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770
F.2d 128, 132 (8th Cir. 1985).
79. See, eg., West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1226-27
(8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. CL 962 (1987); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer
Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1985); Schroeder v. William Morrow &
Co., 566 F.2d 3, 6 (7th Cir. 1977); see also Denicola, supra note 75, at 528 ("It is the effort
of collecting that must be rewarded in order to preserve incentive and safeguard the au-
thor's investment of time and money ... ").
80. See Denicola supra note 75, at 528. By focusing on labor as the object of protec-
tion, rather than the nature of the work itself, cases following this view ensure that the
economic incentives will be available to the initial compiler.
81. The potential scope of protection is broader under the sweat of the brow view
because it does not require the compiler to exercise skill or editorial judgment in the
selection or arrangement. See West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent. Inc., 799 F.2d
1219, 1228 (8th Cir. 1986) (basing eligibility for protection on effort and extended actual
protection to page numbers in West's reporters), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987).
Compare this result with Financial Information Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d
204, 208 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. CL 79 (1987), where a compilation of bond
notices was not copyrightable, even though it required much labor, because no editorial
selectivity was involved.
82. See Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 129 (8th Cir.
1985).
83. See West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent. Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1228 (8th Cir.
1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987).
84. See, e.g., Financial Information Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204,
207 (2d Cir. 1986) ("statute thus requires that copyrightability not be determined by the
amount of effort the author expends, but rather by the nature of the final result"), cert
denied, 108 S. CL 79 (1987); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory
Publishers, 756 F.2d 801, 810 n.9 (11th Cir. 1985) ("originality is to be tested by the
nature of the selection and arrangement of the preexisting material in the compilation");
Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 860 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding plaintiff's price
catalog of baseball cards, designating a select group as "premium," or more valuable,
qualified as sufficiently original to sustain valid copyright); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet
19881
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proach is referred to as subjective selection because it adheres closely to
the language of the second part of the statutory definition of compila-
tions: "selected, coordinated, or arranged." 5 These courts examine
whether the compiler has exercised subjective judgment in the selection
or arrangement of material in the compilation and explicitly reject the
idea that copyright law protects labor.8 6 Consequently, they ignore evi-
dence of labor, effort and expense.8 7
Instead, these courts emphasize creative skill and judgment in the se-
lection and arrangement process of compiling facts.88 For example,
under this view, a compilation of all the municipal bond redemptions
occurring in a year was denied protection because it involved no editorial
skill or judgment.8 9 By contrast, a catalog listing trading prices of base-
ball cards was held protected because it contained a subset of cards that
the compiler had judged to be "premium" cards, commanding a higher
trading price.9 ° Under this view, compilations of all the items in a given
universe may not receive copyright protection, but a subset of items in
that universe may.
The subjective selection view tends to emphasize the dissemination
goal of copyright law9' and seems to overlook that incentives to authors
are necessary to accomplish that goal. Courts adhering to this view rea-
son that considering the labor expended would give protection to re-
search (as opposed to expression), which is generally regarded as beyond
the scope of copyright law protection.92 Thus, the subjective selection
Management Sys., 634 F. Supp. 604, 606-07(N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that in determining
copyrightability of mileage data on map, no reference should have been made to amount
of labor involved).
85. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
86. See, e.g., Financial Information Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204,
207 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79 (1987); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801, 810 (11th Cir. 1985); Eckes v. Card
Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Manage-
ment Sys., 634 F. Supp. 604, 607 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
87. See cases cited supra note 84.
88. See cases cited supra note 84; see also Denicola, supra note 75, at 527-28.
89. In Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79 (1987), the plaintiff, a publisher of financial information,
claimed that the defendant infringed its "Financial Daily Card Service," which consisted
of packets of index cards on which were printed information taken from newspaper
"tombstone" advertisements about municipal bonds that were being redeemed. Id. at
205. The plaintiff sought to include all United States municipal bond redemptions. Id.
The defendant, also a publisher of financial news, reported similar information, but rather
than attempt to cover all municipal bond redemptions, reported only on those it rated
(about 90% of the total). Id. at 205-06 (citing a prior disposition of the case, 751 F.2d
501, 503 (2d Cir. 1984)). The defendant's reports also contained a substantial amount of
related information on the financial conditions of government entities. Id. at 206. The
Second Circuit upheld the district court's reasoning, that " '[t]he only selectivity involved
is principally one of format.... With this data, there is no room for selection or choices
or judgment.'" Id. at 207.
90. See Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863 (2d Cir. 1984).
91. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g. Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204,
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view reflects a greater concern for users than creators.
3. Reasons for the Disagreement
In part, this confusion over the definition of originality arises because
the case law on originality developed mainly from cases involving crea-
tive or artistic works.93 The general definition of originality, independent
creation,94 better suits artistic or literary works such as novels, where it is
easier to distinguish between protectible expression and a nonprotectible
element such as plot, which is only an idea.9 5 By contrast, independent
creation has proved difficult to apply in analyzing originality in factual
compilations because a compiler, by definition, uses material that he cop-
ies from existing sources.9 6 What a compiler independently creates is the
collection of facts.9 7 Moreover, in theory the collection can be protected
only to the extent that it represents the compiler's expression of a set of
facts.9
8
The difficulty arises because expression-or manner of presentation-
in a factual compilation often cannot be separated from the facts
presented, calling the merger doctrine9 9 into play. For example, the facts
207 (2d Cir. 1986) ("To grant copyright protection based merely on the 'sweat of the
author's brow' would risk putting large areas of factual research material off limits and
threaten the public's unrestrained access to information."), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79
(1987); see also Note, Copyright Protection for Compilations of Fact: Does the Originality
Standard Allow Protection on the Basis of Industrious Collection?, 62 Notre Dame L Rev.
763, 777-78 (1987) (arguing that the "industrious collection" doctrine contravenes poli-
cies underlying the statute).
Courts often turn to the cases discussing copyright protection for research. The major-
ity of these cases hold that research is not protectible. See, e-g. Miller v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th Cir. 1981); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); but see Toksvig v.
Bruce Publications Corp. 181 F.2d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1950). The difference is, however,
that these works are nonfiction narratives, in which it is easier to separate protectible
expression from the unprotectible facts. Thus, copyright doctrine may be applied with-
out raising the theorectical difficulty present in factual compilations of determining what
constitutes expression.
93. See, eg. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cir.
1951) (derivative work, mezzotint engraving reproduction of work in the public domain);
Gerlach-Barklow Co. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927) (painting);
Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929) (itho-
graphs used on shoe box labels).
94. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
95. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir.1930) (no in-
fringement because defendant copied only plot and events), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902
(1931).
96. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
97. That is, the collection the compiler creates forms a single source containing the
facts, as distinguished from the dispersed, individual facts. Creation of "a compilation of
pure fact, entails originality." Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 547 (1985).
98. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 34. The idea-expression and merger doctrines are codified in 17
U.S.C. § 102(b). See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 5659, 5670; supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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presented in a telephone directory are arranged in the only logical way-
alphabetical order. "" Because the phone numbers (facts) cannot be sepa-
rated from the alphabetical listing (presentation), the merger doctrine, if
applied, would bar copyright protection for such a work. 10' Courts,
however, have not applied the merger principle consistently in compila-
tion cases. 10 2
In addition, courts often confuse artistic originality with the legal con-
cept of originality. 10 3 Originality in literary or artistic works generally
implies a subjective assessment of aesthetic quality."' The legal concept
of originality, however, is confined to an objective assessment of how the
work came into existence, not its qualitative merit. 105
B. Infringement
Even given a uniform analysis of originality, confusion would remain
as to the extent of copyright protection available to factual compila-
tions. 1°6 Infringement and fair use govern this aspect of copyright analy-
sis. °7 The unauthorized copying of a copyrighted work constitutes
infringement, "' 8 subject to the fair use defense. 19 Copying often is deter-
100. Nevertheless, courts have not invoked the merger doctrine in telephone directory
cases. Thus, even a different arrangement of names and numbers in a telephone directory
did not escape a court's judgment of infringement. See Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91
F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937) (finding defendant's creation of an inverse directory infringed
plaintiff's traditional alphabetical directory).
101. See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th
Cir. 1984); supra note 34.
102. Compare Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting
defendant's argument that there is nothing left to protect in a factual compilation when
the facts are separated from the arrangement of the work, especially where the format is
required by the nature of the subject) with Matthew Bender & Co. v. Kluwer Law Book
Publishers Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1363, 1364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying merger doctrine
in holding charts not copyrightable). See also Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory
Co., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985) (merger doctrine not raised); Schroeder v. William
Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977) (same).
103. See Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983) (originality
in copyright has legal, rather than aesthetic, function to prevent overlapping claims).
104. See id.
105. See id.; see also supra note 67.
106. Compare Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d
809, 812-13 (7th Cir. 1942) (applying rule that compilers must "start from scratch" to
avoid infringing) with New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F.
Supp. 217, 221-22 (D.N.J. 1977) (recognizing availability of fair use defense when defend-
ant copied plaintiff's compilation for use in another compilation).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 49-61. In factual compilation cases, the right
of reproduction (copying) is the right alleged to be infringed.
108. See Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092-93 (2d
Cir. 1977) (copying may be proved by access and "substantial similarity," as determined
by the ordinary lay observer). However, this test has been applied in various ways. See
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir. 1986)
(rejecting ordinary lay observer part of test in works involving "exceptionally difficult"
materials, such as computer programs), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987); 3 M. Nimmer
& D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[A], at 13-21 to 13-36 (1987) (discussing the
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mined by examining whether the works are substantially similar.I"o In
theory, this analysis applies uniformly to illicit copying of all types of
works.111 In practice, however, it does not work well for factual compi-
lations." 2 Consequently, courts have approached infringement in two
basic ways. 1
3
Some courts have viewed infringement in factual compilation cases as
a question of whether the second compiler has used the first compiler's
work to produce his own." 4 Under this approach, the second compiler
must "start from scratch," and compile facts from the original sources in
order to avoid infringement." 5 The subsequent compiler may use the
same facts in producing his own compilation, but only if he obtains them
from the original sources."' This analysis superficially comports with
the copyright goal of providing incentives to authors." 7 Its application
is clear-cut and seems to result in fairness to the first compiler." 8 Its
practical effect, however, is to give protection to facts, at least to the first
various tests of substantial similarity, such as "abstractions," "pattern," "total concept
and feel," and "literal similarity").
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
110. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
111. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982).
112. If the alleged infringement only involves copying isolated facts from the plaintiff's
work, the defendant is off the hook because facts alone are not copyrightable. If, how-
ever, the second compiler copies a portion of the facts, in their arrangement, the case is
less clear, and substantial similarity analysis is of little assistance. See, eg., Hutchinson v.
Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 132 (8th Cir. 1985). Substantial simi-
larity may be more useful when the second compiler copies all the facts as arranged or
selected by the first compiler. See, eg., Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863-
64 (2d Cir. 1984). But in such a case, the second compiler would argue that the arrange-
ment or selection is merely a nonprotectible idea. See id at 862.
113. See infra notes 114-124 and accompanying text.
114. See e.g., Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5-6 (7th Cir. 1977);
Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 640 F. Supp. 386, 387 (D. Minn. 1986);
see also Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 274 F. 932, 935
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) ("Every one concedes that a second compiler may check back his in-
dependent work upon the original compilation, but there has been some dispute whether
he may use the original compilation after simply verifying its statements, or whether he
must disregard the assistance of the original, except in subsequent verification."), aff'd,
281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cerL denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
115. See supra note 114.
116. See Schroeder, 566 F.2d at 5-6.
117. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
The start-from-scratch rule is theoretically consistent with the principles that 1) facts
cannot be copyrighted, leaving the second compiler free to use the same facts if he obtains
them from the original sources, and 2) that labor should be rewarded as an incentive to
create, preventing the second compiler from reaping where he has not sown. See. e.g.,
Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 132-33 (8th Cir. 1985);
Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 812-13 (7th
Cir. 1942).
118. Applying the start-from-scratch rule requires a factual determination whether the
alleged infringer copied from the first compilation. The additional inquiries of traditional
infringement analysis-whether the two works were substantially similar, see supra note
57, and whether the use was fair, see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982)-are given less weight.
In addition, under this approach the first compiler would be assured of reaping the
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compiler. 119 Thus, the start-from-scratch rule thwarts copyright's dis-
semination goal.' 20
A second view, ultimately more consistent with copyright doctrine,
recognizes the impracticalities of the start-from-scratch approach, which
requires subsequent compilers to reinvent the compilation.12 ' This sec-
ond approach allows the subsequent compiler to build on the work of the
first. 122 Thus, he may take facts from the prior compilation as long as he
uses the information in another form or arrangement.1 23 This approach
proves superior to the start-from-scratch rule because it distinguishes
more accurately between the protectible and nonprotectible elements of a
copyrighted work.' 24
The confusion over infringement of compilations stems partly from the
statute, which provides that the copyright in a compilation "extends only
to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished
from the preexisting material employed in the work."' 25 Whether the
term "material" applies to the data collected by the compiler, or whether
it refers only to the compiler's manner of arranging and otherwise
presenting the material remains unclear.'26
rewards of his efforts because it prevents a subsequent compiler from taking advantage of
the work done by the first compiler at little or no expense to himself.
119. In theory, the facts contained in the compilations may be used by anyone and
may not be claimed for exclusive use by the initial compiler. However, the subsequent
compiler is barred from taking them from the first compilation. Thus, the practical effect
of this rule actually protects facts. See, e.g., Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory
Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1985); Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d
3, 6 (7th Cir. 1977).
120. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
121. See New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217
(D.N.J. 1977) In Roxbury, the defendant compiled a "Personal/Name Index/to the 'New
York Times Index'/1851-1974" using the New York Times Index. The court held that
this was fair use because defendant's index only listed names and citations to the pages on
which they appear in the Times Index, not the actual location in the paper, which was
available only by going to the Times Index. Id. at 219; see also Worth v. Selchow &
Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1987) (use of trivia facts taken verbatim from
the plaintiff's book and used in a board game did not infringe expression because it con-
stituted "mere indispensable expression" [merged expression]) (emphasis omitted), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1271 (1988); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Sys., 634 F.
Supp. 604, 607 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (dictum suggesting that copying data from the first com-
pilation and using it to compute information in second compilation would not constitute
infringement).
122. See cases cited supra note 121.
123. See, e.g., Worth, 827 F.2d at 573; Rand McNally & Co., 634 F. Supp. at 607; New
York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221-22 (D.N.J. 1977).
124. See, e.g., Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1987)
(finding arrangement and selection were the protectible elements), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1271 (1988); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Sys., 634 F. Supp. 604, 607
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (observing that data copied from one compilation and recalculated for
use in second compilation "might not involve the same appropriation of selection and
arrangement").
125. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982).
126. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982). One court has interpreted this clause to cover the
contribution of the effort by a compiler needed in translating information from its origi-
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Copyright law governs an important national interest--creation of
works that promote the progress of useful arts. 27 The copyright clause
of the Constitution itself sprang from the need to replace inconsistent
state laws with a single federal law.12 Therefore, consistent application
of the copyright law remains imperative.
III. PROPOSED RESOLUTION
Frustrated by the conceptual difficulties described above, some courts
and commentators note that copyright law may not provide the ideal
form of protection for factual compilations. 29 They suggest state misap-
propriation law, modelled on the doctrine of misappropriation recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in International News Service v. Associated
Press, as a replacement. 130 The International News Service form of mis-
appropriation bases protection on a limited property right arising from
the investment of labor and expense. '' The basic elements of this partic-
nal source into a pictorial presentation. See Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory
Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Here Rockford Map made a contribution.
Its employees dug through the records and turned the metes and bounds of the legal
descriptions into a pictorial presentation. Teasing pictures from the debris left by convey-
ancers is a substantial change in the form of the information."), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1061 (1986). See also Patry supra note 34, at 16 n.30 (if read literally, the "term 'material
contributed by author'. . . might result in no protection").
127. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright § 1.03[A], at 1-31 to 1-32.2 (1987); supra note 5 and accompanying text.
128. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129-30, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. Admin. News, 5659, 5745:
One of the fundamental purposes behind the copyright clause of the Constitu-
tion, as shown in Madison's comments in The Federalist, was to promote na-
tional uniformity and to avoid the practical difficulties of determining and
enforcing an author's rights under the differing laws and in the separate courts
of the various States. Today, when the methods for dissemination of an au-
thor's work are incomparably broader and faster than they were in 1789, na-
tional uniformity in copyright protection is even more essential than it was then
to carry out the constitutional intent.
Id. at 5745. See also Crawford, Pre-Constitutional Copyright Statutes, 23 Bull. Copyright
Soe'y 11, 12 (1976) ("By the time the Revolutionary War broke out, Jeremy Belknap ....
Tom Paine, Joel Barlow, and Noah Webster were agitating for comprehensive copyright
laws."). By 1786, 12 of the states had laws governing copyright. Id. at 13.
129. See, e.g., Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers,
756 F.2d 801, 809 n.9 (11th Cir. 1985); National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Brad-
street, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, 95 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also Gorman, supra note 15, at 1571
("Where it is clear that it is labor, effort, and expense that is sought to be protected, the
most apt body of protective principles might be found in that branch of the law of unfair
competition dealing with misappropriation.").
130. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). In International News Service, the court affirmed the injunc-
tion granted plaintiff news wire service to prevent competitor wire service from copying
its news reports and selling them as its own. Id. at 246.
131. The court noted that:
[A]lthough... neither party has any remaining property interest as against the
public in uncopyrighted news matter after the moment of its first publication, it
by no means follows that there is no remaining property interest in it as between
themselves. For, to both of them alike, news matter, however little susceptible
of ownership or dominion in the absolute sense, is stock in trade, to be gathered
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ular form of misappropriation are creation of a product through exten-
sive labor and skill or money, unauthorized use of the intangible
elements of the product in competition with its author at minimal ex-
pense to user (a "free ride"), and resulting commercial damage.132
Misappropriation, however, relies on state law, 133 which raises the
problems of nonuniformity and federal preemption under section 301 of
the Copyright Act. 134 Nevertheless, the rationale underlying the doc-
trine is a sound one in the context of factual compilations: preventing
misappropriation of the valuable intangible elements in works created
through labor and expense. 135 This Note proposes a statutory interpreta-
tion of the copyright law that incorporates a misappropriation analysis
akin to that of International News Service 136 in the context of factual
compilations. 137
A. Copyrightability of Compilations: Interpreting the Definition
The statutory definition of compilations suggests that Congress viewed
at the cost of enterprise, organization, skill, labor, and money, and to be distrib-
uted and sold to those who will pay money for it, as for any other merchandise.
Id. at 236.
132. See id. at 240. International News Service was litigated in federal court because of
diversity jurisdiction, not as a copyright case. See id. at 232-33.
133. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), misappropriation became a question of state law. United States Golf Ass'n v. St.
Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1036 (3d Cir. 1984). See, e.g., Schuchart & Associates v.
Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 944 (W.D. Tex. 1982).
134. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982) provides in relevant part:
[A]II legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright ... are governed exclusively by this ti-
tle.... [N]o person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such
work under the common law or statutes of any State.
Id.; see Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204, 208-09 (2d
Cir. 1986) (misappropriation preempted), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 79 (1987). Some confu-
sion surrounds the question whether misappropriation is preempted, see Abrams, supra
note 41, at 539-48. The ambiguity seems to stem from varying uses of the term, rather
than a lack of congressional intention. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 130,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5659, 5746 (§ 301 is intended "to
preempt and abolish any rights under the common law or statutes of a State that are
equivalent to copyright and must extend to works coming within the scope of the Federal
copyright law"). The House Report later explains that "'[m]isappropriation' is not nec-
essarily synonymous with copyright infringement, and thus a cause of action labeled as
'misappropriation' is not preempted if it is in fact based neither on a right within the
general scope of copyright." Id. at 5748.
135. See National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, 95
("Diligent application has, through copyright, been accorded a measure of protection
because that is the only protection which is meaningful.").
136. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
137. One commentator advocates that copyright should evolve under misappropria-
tion principles. See Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
1037, 1117 (1986). This Note does not advocate that trend as a general matter. It recog-
nizes that the requirements for protection under copyright law are distinct from those
under misappropriation. In the case of factual compilations, however, the statute itself
appears to encompass a misappropriation-like analysis.
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both labor and arrangement as relevant in determining originality.'
The first prong, "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of
data" refers to the physical process of gathering the material.' 39 The
second prong, "selected, coordinated, or arranged,"4o encompasses the
mental process of deciding how the material should be presented. The
third prong, "in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes
an original work of authorship," 14 ' requires an overall assessment of
work.
Thus, the statutory definition first indicates that labor should be con-
sidered as evidence of independent creation, not that it alone fulfills the
originality requirement. 42 Second, the selection, arrangement or coordi-
nation of the material should be examined.' 4 3 This prong of the defini-
tion should not be construed to impose a standard of qualitative merit.'"
Because factual compilations contain material that can be arranged or
selected in only a limited number of ways, they logically cannot be pro-
tected under copyright and yet be subject to a strict application of the
merger doctrine. Therefore, the compilation should also be considered as
a whole, taking into account both the labor and arrangement elements, in
order to ensure that the work has been independently created. 45 This
interpretation favors a broad grant of copyrightability. While a number
of judicial decisions have followed a similar approach, they have not ar-
ticulated a coherent rationale.'"
138. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
139. See id (emphasis added).
140. See id (emphasis added).
141. See iad (emphasis added).
142. See C.S. Hammond & Co. v. International College Globe, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 206,
216 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (finding labor evidence of independent creation); see also Hutchin-
son Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1985); Schroeder
v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977); Denicola, supra note 75, at 530
(distinguishing "process of culling and assembling" the facts from the "discovery of the
facts themselves"); Patry supra note 34, at 25-26 (reading first prong of the definition to
mean "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or data").
143. For cases emphasizing the arrangement/selection prong, see cases cited supra
note 84. The proposed analysis retains this factor, with the qualification that courts
should not require "subjectivity" in selecting items.
144. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
145. See e.g., Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (9th
Cir. 1970). See also Patry, supra note 34, at 26 (third prong of the definition of compila-
tions is that the work, "by virtue of that selection, coordination, or arrangement may be
said to be as a whole 'an original work of authorship' ").
146. See, eg., Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145, 148
(7th Cir. 1985) (noting that plaintiff's contribution was effort, even though copyright
does not depend on amount of time required), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986); United
States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, 450-51 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting map was result of crea-
tive efforts, and that selection, design and synthesis are elements of originality); Dow
Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding stock
index copyrightable because it involved effort and judgment).
This combined approach appears in a number of early cases. See, eg., General Draft-
ing Co. v. Andrews, 37 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir. 1930) (stating that elements of copyright are
"selection, arrangement, and presentation of the component parts"); Baldwin Cooke Co.
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B. Comparison of Misappropriation Principles and Copyright Analysis
of Compilations
A liberal policy of copyrightability must be tempered by greater scru-
tiny in the analysis of infringement and fair use. 147 This aspect of copy-
right analysis dovetails with misappropriation analysis148 in that the fair
use and misappropriation doctrines share the aim of preventing a subse-
quent compiler from pirating the work of the earlier compiler and using
it in direct competition with that compiler, resulting in commercial
damage. 149
Courts applying the sweat-of-the-brow standard of originality 5 ° and
courts enforcing the start-from-scratch rule of infringement 5' implicitly
rely on the misappropriation rationale'52 because they emphasize the ini-
tial compiler's investment of labor and protect it from piracy by subse-
quent compilers. This approach, however, is only partially satisfactory,
because labor, on its own, is an insufficient basis for finding originality.
The proposed originality standard requires examining both labor and ar-
rangement elements. Because a compiler's labor offers evidence of in-
dependent creation, a compiler ultimately would receive protection for
his labor under the fair use analysis, 53 but only as to other, directly com-
peting compilers. Noncompeting compilers of the same facts would be
permitted free use of the facts contained in the compilation. 154 Applying
such an analysis not only preserves incentives to compilers, but ensures
access to information.
v. Keith Clark, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 650, 654 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (requiring work and a new
arrangement for copyrightability); C.S. Hammond & Co. v. International College Globe
Inc., 210 F. Supp. 206, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (stating that elements of copyright "'consist
in the selection, arrangement and presentation of the component parts,'" yet viewing
labor involved in map making as evidence of independent creation) (quoting General
Drafting Co. v. Andrews, 37 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir. 1930)).
147. See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 494 (2d Cir.) (Meskill, J.,
dissenting) ("The objective is to progress first and, if necessary, litigate the question of
infringement later."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976); Gorman, supra note 38, at 561-62
(calling fair use doctrine flexible enough to sustain borrowing of material in fact works).
148. See supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982); supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1226-27
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer
Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1985).
151. See Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5-6 (7th Cir. 1977); Adven-
tures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 812-13 (7th Cir.
1942).
152. See supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
153. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
154. See id. In Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1271 (1988), the court affirmed the district court's finding of no in-
fringement, even though the defendant had copied portions verbatim from plaintiff's
trivia book, because there was no substantial similarity between the works. Id. at 573.
The public interest thus is enhanced by a greater variety of sources for knowledge and
information.
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CONCLUSION
Copyright law is designed to promote the public good by encouraging
the creation and dissemination of works embodying knowledge and in-
formation, including compilations of facts. The law advances this goal
by balancing the interests of the individual who creates against the inter-
ests of the public, setting limits on what can be protected and how it may
be used. The doctrines that define these limits, are, however, not easily
applied to compilations of facts.
The suggestion that state misappropriation law, based on the doctrine
recognized in International News Service v. Associated Press,'55 should be
adopted to protect factual compilations initially is appealing because mis-
appropriation principles provide a sound rationale for protecting factual
compilations. Unfortunately, this solution is flawed because it would
leave protection to state law, inviting greater potential for inconsistencies
in an already confused area of law.
Fortunately, however, similar protection can be achieved through
copyright law by shifting the emphasis of the analysis. For compilations
to be protected under copyright, the test of originality must be independ-
ent creation, as it is for all works. This should be determined by examin-
ing both effort and arrangement/selection factors. Infringement analysis
must distinguish between protectible and nonprotectible elements, which
are often difficult to separate in factual compilations. Courts thus should
focus on whether the copying, assuming arguendo it infringes, can be
excused as a fair use. Using this approach, copyright law may provide
meaningful protection to factual compilations, yet ensure that subsequent
compilers will have free access to build on prior works.
Sarah Lum
155. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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